Does the refugee challenge national identity?

Jacques Derrida talks about identity in terms of essentialism which entails the belief that there is a “pure origin” to all things.[1] In this sense, it is the belief that there is an fundamental essence to every entity that “just is” and cannot be disputed or dismantled. It is this pure origin that pre-empts any further identifiable qualities of that entity.[2] Derrida positions himself against essentialist forms of identity with the assertion that there is no pure origin and that all entities derive meaning through their relation to other entities. He uses signs as his primary example to support this position, contending that a letter in the alphabet draws its meaning from its distinction from and in relation to the other letters.[3] What is also interesting is that these letters then take on different meanings depending on each arrangement, thus making identity not fixed but dynamic and processual. Derrida argues that meaning is produced as opposed to being self-evident and named this process of differentiation and relation, “différance”.[4] He then applies this theory of différance to humans with the idea that we can only understand who we are in relation to others throughout history, presently, and in our conceived futures.[5] We derive meaning from this relationship as opposed to just being.[6]

Looking at the collective identity of the nation-state, Sarah Kyambi argues that it is this essentialist view that underpins understandings of national identity.[7] This is to say that there has been a historical acceptance that a nation “just is” and does not need to be consciously constructed into existence.[8] This adds an immutable quality to national identity suggesting it is fixed and stable with clear boundaries; it is already “complete” and “static”. [9] Kyambi, like Derrida, argues that this is an assumed but unrealistic perspective and suggests that the boundaries of a nation are, in fact, in constant motion.[10] Much like letters, national identity can only be constructed through its relationship with what exists outside of itself and this tension between inside and outside is what is constantly negotiated. It is state ambivalence, therefore, that is produced in this seemingly contradictory presentation of what national identity is perceived to be and how it is produced.[11] Kyambi further claims that this state of ambivalence is denied in order to uphold promises of security and stability.[12] One only need to think of Theresa May’s repeated assurance of a “strong and stable” United Kingdom in the months leading up to the 2017 general election amidst fears of exiting the European Union. What Kyambi argues is that, in reality, a stable condition can never be achieved despite it constantly being the aim. To draw on Derrida again, there is no pure origin of national identity; it is an ongoing process underpinned by uncertainty and it is this uncertainty that produces state ambivalence.[13]

Derrida supports this argument by tracing national identity back to invasion, contending that there is no place that is “pre-invasion” of human beings.[14] The negotiation of inclusion versus exclusion can therefore only happen “post-invasion”.[15] In other words, the “purity” within the theory of a pure origin can only be achieved in the secondary sense through a rigorous process of exclusion. This idea demystifies essentialist notions of national identity as it implies that nations are not self-evident but are constantly under construction. If the construction of national identity is in constant motion and the included versus the excluded is forever being negotiated, then the assumed regulation and maintenance of a fixed boundary of a nation is in fact an ongoing conflict over the location of the boundary.[16] Furthermore, the location of the boundary can only be known when it is being threatened or crossed.[17]

The Stranger

Positioning himself against essentialist forms of identity, Derrida claims that fixed categories of “inside/outside” do not exist as their processual nature of relation and distinction results in an additional element of “in-between”.[18] Zygmunt Bauman personifies this “in-between” as the “stranger” that goes unseen in the attempt to decipher a “friend” from an “enemy”.[19] In other words, those that are yet to be categorised as either being included in the nation-state (friends) or are rejected and denied entry (enemies) are the strangers and these strangers are what embody state ambivalence.

Considering the stranger as represented by the refugee, in imagined notions of national identity, the refugee presents an uncertain, ambivalent entity coming into conflict with an entity that is “fixed and unambivalent”.[20] This presents a paradoxical challenge to the nation-state as refugees expose the ambiguity of the location of the boundary and are thus emblematic of the nations’ need to establish who is both included and excluded in order to maintain the pretence that the boundary is fixed. Therefore, the idea of the refugee being a stranger is denied in order to maintain this imagined notion of bounded completeness. What becomes paradoxical is the idea that the denial of the refugee as a stranger is what makes the refugee so important to the process of sustaining national identity.[21] Kyambi complicates the refugee’s role by suggesting that as the state refuses to accept the stranger-like nature of the refugee as representative of the “in-between-ness” within binary understandings of national identity, the state also projects their ambivalence onto the refugee.[22] In this way, the refugee becomes a problem that must be stifled and this is arguably evident when observing the treatment of refugees at state borders.

The Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees adopted in 1951 defines a refugee as someone fleeing their state “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”.[23] Therefore, International Refugee Law (IRL) has created a fixed identity for the refugee which means those seeking asylum at a state border are to be dependent on whether they have the appropriate identity, i.e. are a refugee. This pertains to the same essentialist notions of identity in that the asylum seeker will either contain some true essence of what it means to be a refugee or they will not. The issue that has been raised here is that this naturalises the identity of the refugee so it is difficult for decisions being made at immigration controls regarding the status of the refugee to be challenged. This is because the refugee just “is”.[24]

This produces two results: procedures for appealing a failed application to receive refugee status becoming increasingly difficult as one cannot theoretically challenge essentialist, purist forms of identity, and an asylum seeker not considered a refugee is therefore deemed fraudulent and disingenuous.[25] This both stigmatises the asylum seeker and limits their agency whilst undermining their experience. Further, as the refugee has been viewed as a fixed identity that cannot be questioned, the law outlining the definition of the refugee is therefore also fixed and can go unchallenged. Therefore any adaptations to the interpretation of this law by immigration authorities also go unchecked as long as they remain within the boundaries of the law. This will be touched on later in this chapter.

Aryan Karimi challenges this narrative by discussing the experience of the asylum seeker and iterating the notion that they construct their identity throughout their journey.[26] Speaking specifically about transnational experiences of Gay Iranian men migrating to Canada, Karimi offers that these men have constructed identities throughout the migration process, having family members in countries mid-journey (primarily Turkey) and through the status of their asylum claim.[27] These men shared that they were “disparately affected by several overlapping social fields, structures and power relations”.[28] What can be seen here is that the identity of the refugee has the ability to transcend not just one state, but can be multinational. This lies outside of the potentially limiting definition within the Geneva Convention and therefore it could be argued that this aspect of IRL undermines the identity of refugees. It also could be ignoring the changing and dynamic nature of global socio-political phenomena and thus the fluid character of the refugee. This could suggest that essentialist theories of identity are not only fixed in substance but are fixed in time which could hinder development and progression.

Patricia Tuitt wrote extensively on this matter, particularly with categories of people that fall within a “social group”. Concerned predominantly with western European migration, she echoes ideas aforementioned in this chapter that the definition of the refugee provided by the Geneva Convention is limiting and “denies the refugee identity”[29]. This reiterates Karimi’s position on the complex and dynamic nature of refugee identity, however, seeing as Tuitt’s was writing twenty-six years prior, she uses sexual orientation as an example of who is not included within the definition of a refugee. This is interesting as, institutions such as the UK Home Office have since stated that those facing persecution on account of their sexual orientation will now be considered to fall within the scope of a “social group”,[30] despite the definition going unchanged. This could again illuminate the idea that having a fixed definition that is overarching and potentially generalising gives licence for states to work within that definition to their own ends. Thus, as much as the inclusion of sexual orientation suggests progressive development, it could be contended that the state is then at equal liberty to retract that addition without being challenged. Furthermore, the process in the UK for receiving refugee status as a person being persecuted for their sexual orientation is seen as both rigorous and evidence-based.[31] Therefore, discretion of the state still takes place within the boundaries of the law.

What is also interesting to note about Patricia Tuitt is her metaphorical use of the word “death” when referring to the refugee experience. She claims the refugee experiences “death” when confronted with the limited definition of the refugee within the Geneva Convention and also with the ability of state immigration controls to manipulate this definition and thus undermine their experience.[32] Conflating legal protection with death implies that to be truly alive, one must be protected by the law and, in the case of the refugee, protected by the state[33]. Therefore, does being alive mean being legally alive?

[1] Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978). [2] Ibid. [3] Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978). [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. [6] Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, (New York: Routledge, 1992). [7] Sarah Kyambi, ‘National Identity and Refugee Law’, in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt (eds), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004). [8] Ibid. p. 20. [9] Ibid. [10] Sarah Kyambi, ‘National Identity and Refugee Law’, in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt (eds), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004). [11] Ibid. [12] Ibid. [13] Sarah Kyambi, ‘National Identity and Refugee Law’, in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt (eds), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004). [14] Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978). [15] Ibid. [16] Sarah Kyambi, ‘National Identity and Refugee Law’, in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt (eds), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004). p. 21. [17] Ibid. p. 21. [18] Ibid. p. 23. [19] Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). [20] Sarah Kyambi, ‘National Identity and Refugee Law’, in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt (eds), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004). p. 24. [21] Ibid. [22] Ibid. p. 24. [23] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention). Article. 2. [24] Sarah Kyambi, ‘National Identity and Refugee Law’, in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt (eds), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004). p. 26. [25]Sarah Kyambi, ‘National Identity and Refugee Law’, in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt (eds), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004). p. 27. [26] Aryan Karimi, ‘Refugees transnational practices: Gay Iranian Men Navigating Refugees status and cross-border ties in Canada’, Social Currents, Vo.7 No.2 (2020), 71-86. [27] Ibid. [28] Aryan Karimi, ‘Refugees transnational practices: Gay Iranian Men Navigating Refugees status and cross-border ties in Canada’, Social Currents, Vo.7 No.2 (2020), p. 72. [29] Patricia Tuitt, False Images: The Law’s Construction of the Refugee, (London, Pluto Press, 1996), p. 2. [30] Home Office, Asylum Policy instruction Sexual orientation in asylum claims, (Home Office Staff, 2016). [31] Jon Henley, “LGBT asylum seekers’ claims routinely rejected in Europe and UK”, (The Guardian 2020). https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jul/09/lgbt-asylum-seekers-routinely-see-claims-rejected-in-europe-and-uk, (Accessed 31st May 2021). [32] Patricia Tuitt, False Images: The Law’s Construction of the Refugee, (London, Pluto Press, 1996), p. 2. [33] Jill Stauffer, ‘The Fiction of the State of Nature in Real Time: The Social Contract, International Human Rights and the Refugee’, Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt (eds), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004).